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The (im)possibilities of Levinas for Christian Theology
Glenn Morrison
Conference Paper, ‘Responsibility, God and Society’ (Leuven, 7-10 May 2008)

Abstract: The paper aims to show how Levinas’ philosophy opens up a style of thinking and
suggests a vocabulary of expression that can serve Christian theology, especially by opening
the possibility of a language of alterity, or radical “otherness”, in theology. Given our
paradox of the (im)possibilities of Levinas for Christian theology and, hence, the very risk of
falling into the language of onto-theology, the paper will firstly relate my approach to
Levinas writings for the benefit of Christian theology.

My special concern for the talk will be to provide an example of doing theology with Levinas.
To this end, I will engage the theology of von Balthasar, no less a complex and many-faceted
thinker than Levinas himself. In this regard, the talk will be limited to exemplifying my
approach through enhancing von Balthasar’s study of John 20:19-23 where the Risen Jesus
identifies himself to the disciples, greets them with peace and initiates their mission with the
power of the Holy Spirit. Our aim here is to provide a context to theologise with the language
of alterity. Consequently, I will suggest four aspects of Levinas’ idea of illeity (diachrony,
the immemorial, effacement and ambiguity) to uncover the sense of the non-phenomenality of
the Risen Christ’s otherness and face. The talk, by seeking to go beyond von Balthasar’s
language of theology to refer to the Risen Christ, will most likely result in the impossibility of
keeping faithful to von Balthasar’s theological boundaries. Yet, it is a risk and a trespass
worth attempting for theology to traverse beyond essence towards ethical transcendence.

An intense interest is emerging between the connection between the philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas and Christian theology. In a number of countries, especially Holland, Belgium,
France, the United States, Italy and South America, Levinas’ work has found its greatest
readership among Christian philosophers and theologians.1 To this list of countries I would
also add the United Kingdom and Australia where a growing number of authors, and in

1

See Adriaan T. Peperzak, “The Significance of Levinas’s Work for Christian Thought,” in Jeffrey Bloechl
(ed.), The Face of the Other & The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2000), 184-185.
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particular, Michael Purcell, Graham Ward, Michael Barnes, David Ford and Terry Veling
have related Levinas’ ideas to particular theologians, saints or to specific areas of theology.2

As with the writers I have referred to, I have found that the writings of Emmanuel Levinas
contain many ideas of value for Christian theology. One of my major courses of study has
been using Levinas’ thought to enhance the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar.3 My method
here involved:
(i)

Remarking on Christian theology’s discovery of Levinas’ philosophy;

(ii)

Introducing three of the major influences of Levinas’ philosophy, namely Edmund
Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Franz Rosenzweig;

(iii)

Presenting a number of Levinasian notions to critique and complement the
theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar under some eleven headings: the there is;
time, the Other, God, encounter, exposure, passivity, prayer, having a sense, truth
and ethical transcendence;

(iv)

Recontextualising, through Levinasian analysis, major sections of von Balthasar’s
theology (aesthetics, dramatics and logic), namely his treatment of Holy Saturday,
the Resurrection, Trinitarian and Soteriological “Inversion”, and truth as
participation;

(v)

Attempting to develop a prolegomenon to a Trinitarian praxis. Intrinsic to the
very understanding of this Trinitarian praxis is the notion of alterity to such a
degree that ethical transcendence is the very inspiration for theology if it is to go
beyond the limits of objectivity, being and presence.

The prolegomenon,

therefore, contains an articulation of Trinitarian praxis in the context of ethical
transcendence, eschatology and soteriology. To this end, I particularly employed
Levinas’ ideas of passivity and otherness to critique von Balthasar’s
eschatological conception of Christian existence and his soteriological
understanding of the eucharist.

2

See Michael Purcell, Mystery and Method: The Other in Rahner and Levinas (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1998); Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998); Michael Barnes, Theology and the Dialogue of Religions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); David Ford, Self and Salvation: Being Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999); and Terry Veling, Practical Theology: “On Earth and It Is in Heaven” (Maryknoll
NY: Orbis Books, 2005).
3
See my PhD Dissertation, Levinas, von Balthasar and Trinitarian Praxis (Australian Catholic University,
2004).
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(vi)

Providing abundant references to Husserl, Heidegger and Rosenzweig at various
junctures in this study as Levinas and von Balthasar have both used their writings;
and

(vii)

Finally, critically examining the views of four Christian theologians who have
been influenced by Levinas (Purcell, Ward, Barnes and Ford) whilst bringing
Levinas and von Balthasar into conversation.

The method here provided an horizon to conclude that, with the aid of Levinas’ ideas,
theology is offered the possibility of breaking out of the limits imposed by traditional notions
of objectivity, being and presence. In reaching such a conclusion, I found new ways of
speaking of the Christian mysteries such as Holy Saturday and the Resurrection, in a nonphenomenal manner.

Using Levinas’ ethical metaphysics, I further discovered that the

deepest problem to be faced by theology is one of giving priority to the ethical over the
ontological. Consequently, by learning from Levinas, I argued for a conception of Christian
life that goes beyond the categories of ontology and experience. Accordingly, I proposed a
notion of Trinitarian praxis in which we come to God by way of ethical transcendence. In
other words, we come to God by taking to heart the biblical call to be like God, welcoming
the stranger, the widow and the orphan (Deut 10:18-19). Trinitarian praxis is being sensitive,
open and intent enough to love our neighbour.

Furthermore, I have found the theology of Walter Kasper, the areas of pastoral care and
counselling, and reflections on psychosis with all its moods and difficulties as rich and
germane contexts for developing pastoral and systematic theology through a Levinasian lens.4
These connections reveal that there are a variety of possible ways for Levinas’ pure
philosophical thought to be related. As a result, we can imagine ways to theologise beyond
the categories of objectivity, presence and being.

Given that Levinas’ thought has brought out the ethical significance of the Bible with the
language of alterity, can we not do the same for theology? The (im)-possibilities lie on
whether theology can ultimately be done beyond ontology, and further, whether it can return
back to being with transcendence, peace, prayer and goodness.
4

To begin facing the

See my articles, “Walter Kasper’s Religious Quest for Jesus Christ”. Irish Theological Quarterly, Autumn (72)
2007, 274-294; “Pastoral Care and Counselling: Towards a Post-Metaphysical Theology of Friendship”.
Australian EJournal of Theology. March 2007, 1-21; and “Phenomenology, Theology and Psychosis: Towards
Compassion”. The Heythrop Journal. July, 2007, 561-576.
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impossible, the ambiguity of developing a sense of transcendence in being despite (or
otherwise than) being, Christian theology needs a language of alterity in the hope of
remaining faithful to intensifying the sense of encounter with Christ and of the other in him.
Though drawing on Levinas’ ideas, it has been my assessment5 that Purcell, Ward, Barnes
and Ford, are not prepared to sever their ties with ontology (the search to understand the
meaning of Being), intentionality (consciousness itself) and hence, analogy (a method using
the categories of Being and consciousness to make rational statements concerning God,
humanity and the world).6 However, I do not blame them, for it is the very road that we all
must take or at least fall into. Whether we believe that Levinas’ thought can be appropriately
discussed and used with notions of being, or whether, like Levinas, we wish to imagine
otherwise, we will nonetheless, at some time, ostensibly or not, choose the good of being
(like Purcell) or fall into its very contamination. And whether or not we can discern the
difference is another thing. Doing theology with Levinas is both possible and impossible. It
is largely possible because Levinas’ thought is like a treasury of keys to unlock the mysteries
of personhood, prayer and ethics. Yet, we also face a sense of the impossible as the language
of alterity itself beckons a whole eternity to be proclaimed. We seem to be always late for the
other and find it so hard to welcome our neighbour with a heart and a smile.

Given our paradox, I suggest we need to find ways, as humbly as we can, to approach
Levinas writings, discover a whole lexicon of terms, and use them for the benefit of Christian
theology. I do not know whether Levinas himself would invite our interest eagerly lest we
homogenize his sense of otherness into our personal experience. Yet he may be intrigued to
see how we Christian theologians return to his writings with awe, respect and a search for the
word of God. As we tremble and find courage to accept the face of the other and learn from
Levinas, we may discover a desire to inform our conscience with personal responsibility for
those on the margins of society. With this in mind, we may also move from a sense of panic
at facing the immensity of Levinas’ complex writings towards an emerging and prophetic
process of finding a rational way to speak of both the incomprehensible other and infinite
God.

5

See my PhD Dissertation, Levinas, von Balthasar and Trinitarian Praxis.
For a discussion of the various meanings of analogy see Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology,
71, 97-98, 152.
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Fundamentally, Levinas’ thought might become possible for theology when we seek to renew
essence or the process of being within the language of alterity, and thus conceive of theology
otherwise than its ontological and phenomenal constructions that might lead us away from
ethics, justice and mercy. In order to seek out the language of alterity, we will risk being
thrown into the language of onto-theology in which the word God is sterilised by the tyranny
of public and post-modern delusions that cry “I, I, I!” Hence, granted that it is possible to
encounter the word of “God”, it would not be unlikely to imagine a difficult condition of
alterity, which, in turn, will demand that theoria and praxis must coincide. In a Levinasian
sense, alterity or otherness refers to being made responsible by the Other to such a degree that
it overwhelms the intentionality of consciousness. More fundamental still, the self is obliged
to sacrifice for the Other to the point of expiation.

The grave implication to do theology with Levinas is to take on the difficult freedom of a
biblical, kenotic life for others. Facing this honestly, through the recognition of responsibility
for the other, may provide a possibility to traverse the conatus and effort of philosophical
intelligence. In other words, the testimony of ethical subjectivity aims to go beyond any form
of philosophical objectivity. Facing the question of the impossibilities or possibilities of using
Levinas’ thought for Christian theology is also to wrestle with the categories of objectivity,
presence and being for finding a rational way of speaking of God. Consequently, considering
the possibility of Levinas for Christian Theology, we want to begin to conceive of a language
of alterity.

As I have indicated, Levinas’ complex lexicon brims with new and suggestive terms. Many
of them such as the there is, trace, diachrony, ambiguity, immemorial past, the face, the
Other, otherness, illeity, the Saying, testimony, incarnation, God, encounter, passivity,
substitution, expiation, sacrifice, gift, conscience, death, prayer, truth, transcendence and
humiliation beg to be translated into a Christian theological context. Any attempt to employ
and apply these terms for theological purposes will encounter resistance from those
ideologically opposed to Levinas. For example, avoiding the significance of the nonphenomenality of the face, some objectors might read the notion of the Levinasian Other as
an abstraction without a personal and essential content. Others could simply be opposed to
any scent of “leashing” Levinas’ thinking for reconceptualising Christian theology as it may
result in facile and even tendentious simplifications.
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Given that Levinas himself was open to engaging with Christianity through writings and
friendships, and that many Christian theologians are taking his thought seriously, it is my
contention that Christian theology should likewise befriend Levinas’ thought with interest
and care. As we begin to hear the word of God resound in Levinas, we can begin also to
explore the possibility for theology to partake of his writings. Further, we might even dream
of the impossible, “What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived, what
God has prepared for those who love him” (1 Cor 2:9)”, that is to say, to hope that a common
ground and a common friendship can be found between Jews and Christians through the
study of Levinas’ writings.

In sum, Levinas’ thought and style are, as all admit, of unusual difficulty. His writings are
never easy, given the complexity, enigma and rigour of his style. Adriaan Peperzak, to give
but one instance, implies that it is impossible to arrive at a complete overall grasp of his
thought.7 But Richard Cohen argues against trying to simplify or systemise it, or even relate
too quickly to other disciplines, lest it be reduced to the ordinary level of moral imperatives.8
It seems clear that Levinas does not leave us with a body of thought or system in any
recognisable sense, as though he was dealing with a particular theory or ethical project. It is
more a deeply person-centred philosophy of moral conscience, developed in a context made
up of a certain range of interlocutors. Clearly the conviction animating my argument is that
Levinas’ thinking should not be “totalised” in its complexity, but be respected in its
capacities to inspire fresh deconstructive possibilities in other disciplines, above all, in
theology.

My special concern now will be engaging the theology of von Balthasar, no less a complex
and many-faceted thinker than Levinas himself. In this regard, the inquiry will be limited to
exemplifying my approach through enhancing his study of John 20:19-23 where the risen
Jesus identifies himself to the disciples, greets them with peace and initiates their mission
with the power of the Holy Spirit. Our aim here is to focus on the non-phenomenality of the
Resurrection in the specific context of von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics. His reflection
of the disciples’ encounter with the Risen Christ in Jn 20:19-23 provides a context to
theologise with the language of alterity.
7

See Adriaan Peperzak (ed.), Ethics as First Philosophy. The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy,
Literature and Religion, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 184.
8
Richard A. Cohen, “Difficulty and Mortality: Two Notes on Reading Levinas,” Philosophy in the
Contemporary World 7:1 (Spring, 2000), 59-61.
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Facing the (im)possibilities of using Levinas for Christian theology, I will employ four
aspects of Levinas’ idea of illeity (diachrony, the immemorial, effacement and ambiguity)
also with his sense of the non-phenomenality of the face, and his ideas of the Third, the there
is, individuation, encounter and expiation. In all truth, by seeking to go beyond von
Balthasar’s language of theology to refer to the Risen Christ, will most likely result in the
impossibility of keeping faithful to von Balthasar’s theological boundaries. Indeed, it may
seem like trespassing upon his thought as a means for developing a language of alterity for
theology. Yet, it is a risk and a trespass worth attempting to traverse beyond essence towards
transcendence. We come, then, to a study of John 20:19-23 with von Balthasar and Levinas.

A Study of John 20:19-23 with von Balthasar and Levinas
Jn 20:19-23 follows on Jesus’ self-disclosure to Mary Magdalene and her announcement to
the disciples of what she has seen and heard. The passage reads as follows:

When it was evening on that day, the first day of the week, and the doors of the
house where the disciples had met were locked for fear of the Jews, Jesus came
and stood among them and said, “Peace be with you.” After he said this, he
showed them his hands and his side. Then the disciples rejoiced when they saw
the Lord. Jesus said to them again, “Peace be with you. As the Father has sent
me, so I send you.” When he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them,
“Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sin of any, they are forgiven them; if
you retain the sins of any, they are retained.”

Commenting on this passage, von Balthasar explains the sending as, “an existential
participation in Jesus’ self-abandonment, in which the Holy Spirit ‘blows’ (Jn 3:8) or is (Jn
7:39)”.9 The participation is connected with a sacramental experience of eucharist and
reconciliation. In this, the reality of the Risen Christ surpasses that of a mediator because his
identity is the eucharist, the forgiveness of sins in the condition of self-abandonment. The
Holy Spirit “blows or is” in Jesus’ eucharistic identity, enabling the disciples to receive the
9

Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. VII, Theology: The New
Covenant, translated by Brian McNeil (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 151.
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Easter gift of the power to forgive sins.10

It follows that Christ is accessible in his

sacramentally objective mode, while the Holy Spirit is an object of knowledge and
experience within such a mode of objectivity.

Much of von Balthasar’s presentation of Christ - from the Incarnation through to the
Resurrection – is structured by his use of the analogy of being and of the transcendentals.
Reflecting on the analogy of the transcendentals, von Balthasar writes:

God does not come primarily as a teacher for us (‘true’), as a ‘redeemer’ for us
(good), but to display and to radiate himself, the splendour of his eternal triune
love in that ‘disinterestedness’ that true love has in common with true beauty’.
For the glory of God the world was created through it and for its sake the world is
also redeemed.11
Given von Balthasar’s privileging of beauty and its associated disinterestedness, there is the
possibility of thinking beyond and outside his analogical, phenomenal and ontological
framework. In the passage just cited, he describes God objectively as a teacher, redeemer and
one who “radiates himself”. More generally, he speaks of God’s Being as the interplay
between beauty, goodness, truth and glory (doxa). In contrast to this, an ethical metaphysical
conception of this interplay can be developed through treating the non-phenomenality of the
Risen Christ’s face in our context of Jn 20:19-23. To take this further, it will be necessary to
refer to four aspects of the trace of illeity, namely diachrony, the immemorial, effacement and
ambiguity. Consequently, alterity rather than analogical thought could provide a way to
articulate God’s glory, beauty, goodness, truth and unity as ethical transcendence (this is
brought out further in greater detail in my contribution to our conference publication,
Festscrift Roger Burggraeve). We press on to uncover the sense of the non-phenomenality of
Christ’s otherness and face.

10

See von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. VII, 151-152.
Hans Urs von Balthasar, My Work: In Retrospect (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 80. See also Angelo
Scola, Hans Urs von Balthasar. A Theological Style, (Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Compnay, 1995), 37.
11
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The non-phenomenality of Christ’s Face
In the resurrection narrative, the disciples are faced with the otherness of the Risen Christ.
Here, we keep in mind that Christ’s otherness in its fullest dimensions also signifies the Holy
Spirit in the depth of the Risen One. In their approach to Christ in his risen appearance, the
disciples are described by John as rejoicing when they see the Lord. We could imagine that
the disciples rejoice or go generously towards the Risen Christ because they have been faced
by him in a metaphysical sense. Their encounter with Christ (Jn 20) is beyond phenomenal
experience, thus presuming an ontological unveiling of truth. At this point the question arises
as to how the disciples might express the Risen Christ’s otherness? The resolution of such a
quandary lies in their sacrificial action in their desire to participate in Christ’s selfabandonment.

In other words, the otherness or the non-phenomenality of Christ’s face

commands the disciples to exist beyond their death like the Risen Christ himself. Thus
summoned with a morality of “being otherwise” than existing in the limits imposed by their
own death, the disciples have the possibility of thinking of what had been closed to them,
namely the incomprehensibility of Christ’s abandonment to the Father’s will.

Their

experience and thought demand a language of alterity by which to express the desire to
participate in Jesus’ self-abandonment through the Spirit to the Father.

We must go further in this consideration of the non-phenomenality of the Resurrection, as we
pick up on the notion of desire.

The disciple’s desire for Christ unfolds as a plot of

individuation and expiation as identity and alterity are united. Like Christ’s individuation on
Holy Saturday, the disciples’ individuation depends on the non-phenomenality of an
encounter. The idea of non-phenomenality is important because it makes space for the word
“God” to be pronounced. Levinas states: “The direct encounter with God, this is a Christian
concept. As Jews, we are always a threesome: I and you and the Third who is in our midst.
And only as a Third does He reveal Himself”.12 The idea of “the Third” speaks of the trace
of illeity and of a triadic structure between the I, the other and God. In such a Levinasian
frame of reference, we can conceive of the Resurrection from a different angle. Even though
the disciples are face to face with Christ, it is the non-phenomenal aspect of the encounter
that is more significant, as can be indicated in reference to the trace of illeity and its bearing
on the otherness of the Risen Christ.

12

Seán Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 247.

10
The Trace of Illeity
The idea of the trace of illeity provides a non-phenomenal sense of the Risen Christ’s
otherness. We can discern then that it is not surprising that the disciples cannot make an
authentically individuative response until Christ breathes the Spirit upon them.

Before

receiving the Spirit, they are in a state of confusion as Luke’s Gospel describes, “They were
startled and terrified, and thought they were seeing a ghost” (Luke 24:37). With this in mind,
let us consider how Levinas distinguishes illeity from the there is, the better to explicate the
otherness that the Gospel witnesses to. He writes:

Ethics is not a moment of being; it is otherwise and better than being, the very
possibility of the beyond. In this ethical reversal, in this reference of the desirable
to the non-desirable, in this strange mission that orders the approach to the other,
God is drawn out of objectivity, presence and being. He is neither an object nor
an interlocutor.

His absolute remoteness, his transcendence, turns into my

responsibility – non-erotic par excellence – for the other. And this analysis
implies that God is not simply the “first other,” the “other par excellence,” or the
“absolutely other,” but other than the other [autre qu’autrui], other otherwise,
other with an alterity of the other, prior to the ethical bond with another and
different from every neighbour, transcendent to the point of absence, to the point
of possible confusion with the stirring of the there is.13
Levinas states that for God to be drawn out of objectivity, presence and being, ethics must be
conceived as the very possibility of the beyond. The ethical metaphysical idea of God is
otherwise and better than essence.

God can only be truly meant in reference to the

neighbour’s proximity and the self’s responsibility for this Other. God’s transcendence is an
ethical signification of what is beyond essence. Furthermore the trace of God in the Other’s
face is described in four ways:
● diachronic (“other with an alterity of the other”);
● immemorial (“prior to the ethical bond”);
● effaced (“transcendent to the point of absence”); and
● ambiguous (“to the point of possible confusion with the stirring of the there is”).
13

Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh PA:
Duquesne University Press, 1998), 165-166.
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These four aspects of illeity (otherness) assist a theological interpretation of Christ’s
otherness as recounted in Jn 20:19-23. In other words, the event of the Resurrection evokes
diachronic, immemorial, effaced and ambiguous aspects of God. This is to argue that the
approach inspires the disciples to exist in Christ’s victory over the power of death. This
conquering of death speaks of substitution to the point of expiation rather than the conatus of
being.

Let us new look at each of these four aspects of illeity in Jn 20: 19-23 in a

preliminary way before we enter into a more detailed discussion.

First, there is diachronic aspect: it approaches God only by way of participation in Jesus’ selfsurrender. The influence of the Resurrection is immemorial because the disciples have been
called by Christ who in turn has been called by the Father before the time of creation to do
his will. It leads to effacement because in the presence of Christ a greater absence is signified
in the objective world.

Lastly, the Resurrection works with a certain ambiguity, in a

Levinasian sense, allowing for the possible confusion of illeity and the there is. Like the
stirring of the there is, the trace of illeity disturbs the self when the neighbour approaches.

We have begun to present how the Spirit of the Risen Christ acts in ways that are diachronic,
immemorial, effaced and ambiguous. Here we may insert Levinas’ idea of the trace in a
manner relevant to our interpretation of von Balthasar. The encounter with the Risen Christ
resists what must be reduced to history and memory in the synchrony of time, for it also
signifies Christ’s Crucifixion and going to the dead on Holy Saturday. The trace of God that
marks the Risen Christ, inspires in the disciples a sense of Christ’s atonement for humanity.
It overwhelms cognition. In other words, when the Risen Christ approaches the disciples, his
otherness signifies the trauma of being obedient to the Father’s will: this is an unimaginable
encounter with the dead in hell. The disciples too must suffer the trauma of being under the
obligation to live lives of substitution to the point of expiation. The Spirit which Christ gives,
disturbs and opens the disciples’ consciousness to the transcendence of Christ in regard to
history. Only in the site of transcendence, in this horizon of openness, can they express the
word of God in their proclamation of God’s Reign. Thus, the otherness of the Risen Christ
appears in a non-phenomenal sense, never representable to their consciousness, but rather
signified in their responsibility to, and for, others.

12
To sum up: the Spirit of the Risen Christ inspires in the disciples a mission specified not only
by Christ’s Crucifixion, but also by his going to the dead. The disciples, like Christ, might be
called to live a life of substitution to the point of expiation. A Levinasian “otherness” helps
to uncover what lies concealed in Jn 20:19-23. In contrast to von Balthasar, we would argue
for a hearing of the Gospel’s enigmatic language through the language of alterity, to which I
shall now try to clarify further. Now, that I have hoped to have given a little bit of a taste of
what I am trying to do, let me offer you a nice slice of coffee cake that my wife always makes
for me on my birthday!

The Transcendentals and the Language of Alterity
Von Balthasar’s intention is always to protect the reality of divine transcendence. For that
reason he employs the various types of analogy. On the other hand, he appears to limit the
conception of God to the transcendental properties of being (“the one, the true, the good, the
beautiful” and glory).14 This analogical position is grounded in a “renewed phenomenology”
by which to gaze upon God’s glory through representations accessible to the eyes of faith.15
A counterposition to both von Balthasar’s ontology and phenomenology can be developed by
way of Levinasian ethical transcendence and sense of otherness. I hope to show that, which
will throw light on the unique character of the otherness of the Risen Lord – in a manner that
evades the constraints of being and phenomenal experience. Specifically, I want to show how
the four aspects of the Levinasian idea of the trace of illeity (diachrony, immemorial past,
effacement and ambiguity) can lead us to an articulation of the beauty, goodness and truth of
the risen Christ’s glory in the language of alterity.

Diachrony and Immemorial Time
For von Balthasar, the Resurrection, like the death and burial, is “a historically determined
event”.16 Furthermore, the idea that Jesus has risen into history amounts to a disclosure of
God’s Being as love, that is, “the direct presentation of the new eon embodied in Christ”.17
Yet, we are faced with an ambiguity of what remains beyond representation in historical time,

14

von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. VII, 242-3.
See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic, Theological Logical Theory, Vol. I: The Truth of the World,
translated by Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 32-33.
16
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale. The Mystery of Easter (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1990), 242.
17
von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, 216, 229.

15
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as when Christ rises “into history” after his death on the Cross.

At this juncture, the

Levinasian idea of the trace of illeity can be pressed into service. First, let us examine the
diachronic aspect of the trace and its relevance to a theology of the Resurrection. The event
of Resurrection is, in some obvious sense, an interruption of historical time; it disturbs
synchronic time with an unthematisable deed and word of God. The “appointed time”, the
kairos, of Jesus’ rising into history is not measurable by quantitative “clock time”.

It

introduces a qualitative change in time as it summons to a new sense of time as awakening to
responsibility to the other in the light of the Incarnation and Paschal Mystery.

The

diachronic time of Christ’s encounter with the disciples makes up the concreteness of the
Resurrection event. It is an encounter outside the disciples’ capacity to measure or reduce the
appearance of the Risen Christ to an act of their transcendental consciousness. In place of an
all-reductive subjectivity, the disciples are overwhelmed by a time-transforming otherness.
Through the gift of Holy Spirit, time is torn away from its moorings in the structure of selfsufficiency, to be drawn into a new time of responsibility. In this state of deep passivity, in
the all-summoning proximity of the other, the disciples are taken out of themselves, and so
disposed to be possessed by the Spirit of Christ.

Hence, the diachrony in the Resurrection event prohibits the disciples trying to grasp Christ’s
Resurrection as an ontological unveiling or as a synchronic experience. For the objectivity or
otherness of the Resurrection is not related to the disciples’ transcendental ego, as though
Christ were an empirical object or intuited essence. Levinas’ understanding of diachrony
permits viewing the Resurrection, not as a phenomenal appearance in synchronic time, but
more through a pure passivity to the other who comes from beyond the frame of any
presence. In this way, Christ’s Resurrection breaks open the disciples’ consciousness and its
thematising propensities. Christ’s own state of absolute passivity is the mark of superindividuation effected through the Cross and Holy Saturday. He bears the trauma of the
wounds of his obedience to the Father. Having risen from the dead, Christ now faces the
disciples in the Spirit of a new time, transcendence and responsibility.

Von Balthasar, however, limits his understanding of the non-phenomenality of the
Resurrection. He expresses Jesus’ Resurrection more in terms of the synchrony of being
rather than the diachrony of time. But the synchrony of being works in reductive fashion, and
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constricts the full disclosure of truth.

In ontological terms, the “truth” of Christ’s

Resurrection would be reduced to a thematisation or an objective proposition of experience.18
In contrast, with a more diachronic inclusion of the Cross and Holy Saturday, the Risen
Christ is in the non-obectifiable other facing the disciples. He breathes on them the Holy
Spirit (Jn 20:22) and opens their minds to a diachronic understanding of the Scriptures in the
light of what God has done and spoken to him (Luke 24:45). Thus they are equipped to
proclaim the Good News and forgive sins.

These dramatic events do not produce an

experience and objective understanding of Christ’s being. They are the outcome of Christ
facing his disciples, marked with the diachronic trace of obedience to the Father’s will.

In the otherness of the face of the Risen Christ, there is both a diachronic and immemorial
trace. For Levinas, diachrony and immemorial time are interconnected terms. For diachrony
is awakening to the immemorial past as an obligation to be responsible prior to any meaning
of freedom. On the basis of the Levinasian idea of immemorial time, I would argue that
Christ’s otherness inspires a responsibility of such far reaching consequence that answers
even for another’s responsibility - for it communicates the power to forgive and retain sins
(John 19:23). By receiving the Spirit, the disciples enter time in its immemoriality, beyond
the measurements, memories or representations of history, as it recalls “in the beginning with
God” (John 1:1). Levinas likens this to the “in” of infinity.19

Through this trace of the immemorial past signified in Christ’s mission and Resurrection, the
disciples are summoned to their own kind of individuation or non-indifference in the
Levinasian sense.

Beyond the systematic comprehensions of ontological thought and

intuitions of essence, and further than any project of the ego-consciousness, the disciples are
subjected to a responsibility to the point of expiation. Such substitutionary responsibility
bears the trace of the Crucifixion and Holy Saturday, as it is still embodied in the wounds of
the Risen Christ. When faced with the Risen Other, this responsibility cannot be declined.
Henceforth, in their new experiences of time, there can be no history that separates them from
either Christ or the suffering other.

18

Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, edited by Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley and
Robert Bernasconi (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 99.
19
Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 166.
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Effacement and Ambiguity
So far I have spoken of diachrony and the immemorial past in the disciples’ encounter with
the Risen Christ. An effacement is also implied. For the Spirit comes from Christ to the
disciples without showing itself, beyond all categories to the point of invisibility and absence;
for their encounter is beyond the domain of essence.

Resurrection is related to Holy

Saturday, but in a non-phenomenal manner. It penetrates the disciples only on the condition
of unconditional receptivity and passivity to the inspiration of the Spirit and the will of the
Father. The self-surrender involved with their encounter with Christ parallels Christ’s own
individuation or self-abandonment on Holy Saturday. As the dead were able to hear the
Father’s word of salvation through the Spirit, so in the same Spirit emanating from the Risen
Christ, do the disciples become witnesses to the offer of salvation to all. In overwhelming
consciousness, in turning it inside out and rendering it incapable of containing the event of
salvation in any present, God’s word is revealed in its transcendence, and its self-effacing
character. In short, there is confusion and ambiguity surrounding the revelation of God’s
word.

The non-phenomenality of Christ’s Resurrection thus also signifies ambiguity. If the Father’s
word in the Risen Christ betokens a transcendence to the point of absence, it is in reference to
the ethical site in which that word can be articulated. The ambiguity involved means that the
disciples cannot simply preach salvation to the world apart from their own responsibility.
The meaning of salvation must be signified in a place and time when the neighbour’s face
draws near in all its forsakenness - otherwise God’s transcendence will be reduced to essence.
Furthermore, the non-phenomenality of the Resurrection has resulted in dogmatic statements
(doxa) of God’s beauty, goodness and truth. But such statements could be proposed within
involving responsibility in this Levinasian sense.

Hence, theology, if it is intent on

appreciating God’s transcendent alterity, must grapple with such ambivalence. Theology
needs to be critically aware of the ease with which “God” can simply be thematised as a
presence in consciousness. When theology tries to conceive of praxis and dogma together, it
must continually pass through ambiguity, in the realisation that it could fall back into onto-
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theology and its associated form of presence. Only by way of “a crooked road”, as Levinas
remarks, can God’s word be signified in the world.20

Until now I have tried to show how the non-phenomenal characteristics of the Levinasian
idea of the trace of illeity (otherness), namely diachrony, immemorial past, effacement and
ambiguity, provide a unique perspective to the Resurrection.

Conclusion
Throughout the paper, I have set out to look at the (im)possibilities of a language of alterity
for theology. I have emphasised that if God’s transcendence is to have meaning, then an
approach that passes beyond the ontological must be articulated. Consequently, towards recontextualising von Balthasar’s theology with the language of alterity, I have pursued this
new formulation by employing Levinas’ ideas of otherness (the trace of illeity), the nonphenomenality of the face, the there is, encounter, and so forth.

More specifically, I have examined von Balthasar’s theology by developing a nonphenomenal sense of the Resurrection. By a selective use of Levinas’ thought, I have been
able to venture beyond the confinements of phenomenology and ontology to discuss the
encounter which took place between the Risen Christ and the disciples.

In this evaluation, I have given priority to Levinas’ idea of otherness, and the consequent
sense of the non-phenomenal. Further, I have been able to develop the Levinasian ideas of
encounter, the face, immemorial time, diachrony, ambiguity and effacement, all in relation to
the Risen Christ’s meeting with the disciples. As a focal text, I have referred frequently to
John 20:19-23. Here we found an opportunity to develop von Balthasar’s reflection in regard
to Easter Sunday. By applying the Levinasian ideas (of illeity (“the he in the depth of the
you”21), diachrony, the immemorial, effacement and ambiguity), I have argued that the Spirit
in the depths of the Risen Christ works to individuate the disciples, so that they share in the
Christ-like self-offering to the Father’s will. When Christ breathes the Spirit on the disciples,
20

See Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, translated by Alphonso Lingis
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Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 165.
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they begin to speak of the other beyond quantitative clock time, that is to say, proclaim the
glory of the Risen Christ. Hence, rather than having doxa alone (cf. Mark 7:7) as the
presupposition for Christian praxis in the context of the Resurrection, I have set out to
imagine the possibility for doxa to concord with Christian praxis. At stake is signifying the
encounter with the Risen Christ as encounter beyond essence, and beyond the phenomena of
experience, so that divine glory might be proclaimed without reducing it solely to theoria.

Furthermore, Levinas’ idea of otherness (trace of illeity), with the corresponding aspects of
diachrony, the immemorial past, effacement and ambiguity, provided an occasion for
developing von Balthasar’s analogy of the philosophical transcendentals (the one, the
beautiful, the good and the true).

Rather than providing an ontological and analogical

structure, I began to employ a Levinasian language of alterity.

In coming to speak of the possibility of Levinas’ thought for Christian theology, it has been a
task full of complexity. I have engaged Levinas’ ideas with only a fragment of von
Balthasar’s theology. At first glance, it might seem that these notions may in fact limit
theology.

However, by bringing out Levinas’ non-phenomenal context of alterity, a

development is possible. Indeed, he even allows that an ethical metaphysical view of the
“Man-God” is possible. He states:

On the one hand, the problem of the Man-God includes the idea of a self-inflicted
humiliation on the part of the Supreme Being, of a descent of the Creator to the
level of the Creature; that is to say, an absorption of the most active activity into
the most passive passivity.
On the other hand the problem includes, as if brought about by this passivity
pushed to its ultimate degree in the Passion, the idea of expiation for others, that
is, of a substitution. The identical par excellence, the noninterchangeable, the
unique par excellence, would be substitution itself.22

In this reflection, Levinas attempts to understand whether the idea of a Man-God can be
related to consciousness.
22

For him, these ideas have philosophical value, especially as they

Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous, Thinking-Of-The-Other, translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara
Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 53-54.
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point to the limits of phenomenology.23

But the passage exemplifies why Christian

theologians have been naturally attracted to his writings; his ideas touch upon the theological
imagination exciting insights and possibilities. In a final word, we seem to learn so much
about the Bible and theology from Levinas. His writings have a life, power and spirit of their
own because they beckon Christian theologians with meaning and an encounter with the
word of God. Levinas is testimony to the sacredness of Judaism for Christianity.

23

Levinas, Entre Nous, 54. Levinas writes, “These ideas, at first blush theological, overturn the categories of
our representation”.

